Book reviewed by Andrew Sloane, March 2025
The Ethics of Generating Posthumans: Philosophical and Theological Reflections on Bringing New Persons into Existence
by Calum MacKellar and Trevor Stammers
London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2023; 246 pages
ISBN 9781350216587, first edition, paperback
AUD$60

In this ambitious collection of essays, editors Calum MacKellar (Director of Research of the Scottish Council on Human Bioethics) and Trevor Stammers (at the time of publishing, editor of The New Bioethics) bring together a range of philosophical and religious perspectives on their central questions: would it ever be ethical to bring posthuman persons into existence; and if so, what would be the necessary conditions for the ethical production of such persons? The essays all clearly focus on the generation of posthuman persons (rather than a more diffuse and generalised discussion of trans- and posthumanism). As such it proves to be a useful addition to the rapidly growing literature in the field that will be of interest to those who wish to bring Christianity and science into fruitful conversation.

The book consists of an introduction, followed by five themed sections and a conclusion.

The Introduction does what a good introduction ought to do: it seeks to define and locate transhumanism and posthumanism (from hereon, H+) as philosophies and movements conceptually and historically, and helpfully outlines the structure and contents of the book.

Part I, “Who is a transhuman and posthuman person?”, addresses fundamental philosophical questions relating to the notion of personhood and its application to transhuman and posthuman beings. The four pieces range from a survey of the history of the notion of “person” (Fuchs), through an affirmation of the personhood of trans/posthumans from a Thomistic/Aristotelean perspective (Playford), through Taylor’s understanding of the ways that humans can express agency under or through technology and the difficulties raised for the H+ agenda (Parker), to Hölzchen’s application of the Kantian categorical imperative to the issue.

Part II, “How can transhuman and posthuman persons be generated?”, consists of an essay by Wilmott that (as the title suggests) surveys the technologies that might be deployed in the H+ project.

Part III, “Philosophical aspects in generating transhuman and posthuman persons”, turns explicitly to conceptual issues relating to generating H+ beings. Eglington opens by suggesting that H+ has more in common with Nietzsche’s notion of the Übermensch than Christian notions of the inherent vulnerability of persons before James suggests more positive perspectives in light of a nuanced application of Heidegger’s theory of technology. Stammers’ piece closes this section by arguing that, whatever the moral status of an intelligent machine (whatever we mean by that), its producers would be morally accountable for any evils it produces.

Part IV, “Theological aspects in generating transhuman and posthuman persons”, presents three “Abrahamic” religious viewpoints: Blausten’s Jewish perspective focuses on the tradition of the golem in rabbinic thought and its relativising of the status of the product versus its producer (more on which below). Wee’s (Christian) Thomistic argument is sharply critical of the H+ project, whereas Suleman suggests that Islamic tradition does not see the generation of novel beings as “playing God” in an inappropriate way. She does, however, suggest that a radically independent being would be deeply problematic, given the importance of a recognition of, and submission to, dependence on God in Islam (as well as Islam’s concern for the interdependence of humans in community).

Part V, “Ethical aspects in generating transhuman and posthuman persons”, considers the relevant ethical questions from two contrasting points of view. MacKellar’s piece focuses on “generation,” contrasting manufacturing (in the case of H+ beings) with procreation (drawing on a particular theological account of the generation of children in the context of a committed marriage). In contrast, Wright adopts a “first person” point of view, asking how a H+ being might see themselves, especially in light of the “genealogical bewilderment” experienced by adopted children and those born using donated gametes.

The conclusion seeks to bring this together. While it seeks to review the various perspectives articulated in the essays, it ends by questioning the possibility of ethically generating H+ persons.

As can be seen from this brief synopsis, this is a wide-ranging book that will reward close reading. It is also impossible to do it justice in a review of this kind, so let me make three comments that might whet readers’ appetites (and stimulate debate with the book).

First, it should be noted that the theological perspectives are drawn from the three monotheistic “Abrahamic” religions, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, with a heavy preponderance of the first. While that is acknowledged by the editors, and fits with the interests of most readers of this journal, this does leave significant gaps in the discussion. It also struck me that broadly conservative Christian perspectives dominate the discussion (especially those from a Thomistic/ natural law tradition). It would have been useful to include an essay (or two) from those who are more open to H+ interests, including, perhaps, a Christian transhumanist. While I find Christian transhumanist arguments unpersuasive, they have a place in a book of this kind.

Second, I was pleased to see a number of pieces consider the importance of the motivations and character of those who generate such persons (a theme that does not always get the attention it deserves). I was fascinated by Blausten’s exploration of Jewish traditions of the golem. If only a truly righteous person could create a golem, this raises the question: given the milieu in which H+ is imagined, can we imagine that a truly righteous person would be motivated to generate a posthuman person? What could possibly be a righteous motivation for such an enterprise (for surely mere utility would not suffice)? Similar questions are also present in Stammer’s piece on moral responsibility, if from a very different perspective. His piece raises important questions about the possibility of a “moral Turing test.” If a machine generates responses that are indistinguishable from those a person would make, must we grant it the equivalent personal (and moral) status? As Searle pointed out in his famous “Chinese room” thought experiment (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-room/), the question of whether there is any “interiority” going on inside the black box that generates an apparently personal (and we might add, moral) response, is fundamental not incidental to the philosophical status of the entity making that response. While an H+ entity may simulate personal and moral qualities, without some kind of understanding (an interior experience as a subject of some kind) it cannot exemplify them.

Finally, and related to this last set of questions, is Wright’s concern with the experience of H+ beings. That properly subjective first-person point of view is quite illuminating. So, too, is her suggestion that a key ethical question in play is whether H+ beings would experience unconditional love and respect. My suspicion is that they may well not. This is a serious concern given that neither this question nor that related to the motivations of those who might generate H+ persons seem to attract much attention in the H+ literature.

Overall, this book is worth adding to your reading list if you are interested in H+ and the possibility of H+ persons. It may not be the first book you turn to, but questions relating to their nature and (theological and moral) status are both interesting and intrinsically important, and so worth the attention of people (like readers of this journal) who wish to explore the intersections of science and faith.